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Abstract. Fault Tree Analysis has been a cornerstone of safety-critical systems for 
many years. It has seen various extensions to enable it to analyse dynamic beha-
viours exhibited by modern systems with redundant components. However, none 
of these extended FTA approaches provide much support for modelling situations 
where events have to be "nearly simultaneous", i.e., where events must occur 
within a certain interval to cause a failure. Although one such extension, Pandora, 
is unique in providing a "Simultaneous-AND" gate, it does not allow such inter-
vals to be represented. In this work, we extend the Simultaneous-AND gate to 
include a parameterized interval – referred to as pSAND – such that the output 
event occurs if the input events occur within a defined period of time. This work 
then derives an expression for the exact quantification of pSAND for exponential-
ly distributed events and provides an approximation using Monte Carlo simulation 
which can be used for other distributions. 
1 Introduction 
The effects of technology now pervade almost every sphere of life, increasing 
human dependency on them. The failures of some of these systems can have  
devastating effects on human life and the environment. Such systems with cata-
strophic effects are known as high consequence or safety-critical systems, so as-
sessing their reliability is of increasing importance. Some modern systems depend 
on duplicated or stand-by components to improve their reliability. However, this 
feature poses other challenges for system designers who need to model and eva-
luate system reliability appropriately. 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a popular technique for analysing how faults or 
combinations of them can cause the total failure, also known as the top-event, of a 
system or subsystem. Developed in the 1960s, fault trees can be analysed logically 
(qualitatively) or probabilistically (quantitatively). Traditionally, these analyses 
are mostly done with the Boolean AND and OR gates. The end products of  
the logical analysis are the Minimal Cut Sets (MCSs), which are combinations  
of basic faults necessary and sufficient to cause the occurrence of the top-event. 
The probabilistic analysis produces numbers representing the probability of the 
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top-event occurrence or the importance of the various terms in the MCSs in rela-
tion to their contribution to the top-event probability.  
However, classical FTA is considered static [1-2], which is a significant disad-
vantage in modern dynamic systems: there are often occasions where accurately 
representing the failure behaviour of the system requires a more flexible and in-
depth description than that provided by ordinary AND and OR gates. Not doing so 
can result in inaccurate evaluation of MCSs and estimation of the top-event prob-
ability [3–5]. As a result, FTA has seen various modifications to enable it to model 
and evaluate modern systems presenting dynamic behaviours. A popular and 
widely used solution is the Dynamic Fault Tree (DFT) [4]. DFTs make use of a 
pre-existing definition of Priority-AND (PAND) gates [6] and introduce other 
dynamic gates -- Spare, Functional Dependency (FDEP) and Sequential Enforcing 
(SEQ) -- to model and evaluate fault trees with dynamic features.  
Apart from DFTs, FTA has seen other modifications. A recent modification of 
FTA is Pandora [5] [7–8] which analyses fault trees logically with three temporal 
gates – PAND, POR, and SAND. PAND stands for Priority-AND and it occurs if 
and only if an input event occurs strictly before another input event; inputs are 
arranged left-to-right with the leftmost occurring first. POR is for Priority-OR – 
which represents the situation where an output event occurs if its first input event 
occurs before its second input event or just the first input event occurs without the 
occurrence of the second input event. Finally, SAND stands for Simultaneous-
AND. A SAND gate is used to represent the situation where all input events to an 
output event occur at the same time. 
Pandora analyses fault trees with its temporal gates by use of its novel temporal 
laws [5] to generate Minimal Cut Sequences (MCSQs), analogous to Minimal Cut 
Sets; this enables a form of temporal qualitative analysis. MCSQs represent com-
binations or sequences that are sufficient and necessary to cause the top event. 
There are also techniques for the quantitative evaluation of the AND and OR gates 
[9], PAND gate [6] [10–12] and POR [13]. Taking an ideal situation, the SAND 
gate evaluates to zero [14] because the probability of exponentially distributed, 
independent events occurring simultaneously is zero.   
One situation which is not covered by either DFTs or Pandora is that of "near 
simultaneity". In some scenarios we may wish to differentiate between a failure 
that occurs because two (or more) events occur within a given time of each other, 
and a different failure that occurs when those events occur further apart. This kind 
of 'interval' occurrence is comparatively common. For example, if a fire is de-
tected and the sprinklers activate almost immediately to extinguish it, then the 
damage may be comparatively minimal; conversely, if there is a delay between the 
alarm and the sprinklers, perhaps because of a blockage in a pipe, the damage may 
be significantly worse.  
Approaches to formalise such scenarios include Duration Calculus [15-16], 
PLTLP [17], CSDM [18], CTL [19], simplified CTL* [20] and PFTTD [21]. In 
general, these approaches are intended to formalise the semantics of timing and  
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sequences of events in the context of simulation and formal specification. Only 
CSDM and Durational Calculus are intended to work with fault trees, and even 
this is primarily via an initial transformation to other forms, e.g. Petri Nets. 
By contrast, DFTs and the Pandora-based approach in this paper are both fault 
tree-centric approaches designed with analysis, rather than specification, as  
the primary goal. However, DFTs in general lack good support for qualitative 
analysis, so we focus here on extending Pandora’s existing capabilities to solve 
this issue. 
Pandora's SAND gate provides the closest semantics to this scenario, but needs 
extending so that it can model a slight time delay between the input events. There-
fore this work seeks define a delay-inclusive SAND gate, which is hereafter  
referred to as the parameterized SAND (pSAND), and to define means of proba-
bilistically evaluating such a gate. The new gate is defined in section 2, and in 
section 3 we present two new mathematical techniques for evaluating the pSAND 
gate: Calculus (exact solution) and Monte Carlo Simulation (approximate solu-
tion). Both techniques are applied to a small case study in section 4. Discussions 
of the results and evaluation of proposed techniques are made in sections 5 and in 
section 6 we present our conclusions. 
2 Parameterized SAND (pSAND) Description 
Nearly simultaneous events are events that will trigger the occurrence of an output 
event if they should happen within a relatively short period of time – i.e., within a 
given interval. A classic example is discussed in the case study in Section 4. To 
model and evaluate the pSAND gate where input events occur within an interval, 
it is expedient that its symbols for modelling, qualitative and quantitative analysis 
be altered to accommodate the change. Therefore the original SAND gate is not 
redefined entirely, but rather slightly extended: 
 
Semantics of pSAND: All input events of the pSAND gate must occur and 
they must do so within a relatively short interval of duration ’d’, which 
starts with the first input event to occur. The pSAND is therefore false if 
any of its inputs do not occur or if they occur outside the interval, i.e., the 
time between the first and last input to occur is more than d.  
 
Since it is not the focus of this work to completely redefine the SAND gate, its 
original graphical symbol (Fig. 1a) is retained for the situation where d=0: input 
events occur at exactly the same time. Alternatively, Fig. 1b can also be used to 
represent the same scenario where d=0. Fig. 1c on the contrary represents a situa-
tion where the input events are nearly simultaneous with a duration, d, between 
them and d>0. 
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Fig. 1 pSAND graphical representations 
SAND’s abbreviation and symbol are changed to pSAND and &d respectively, 
where d will be the duration of the interval. In addition, expressing A &d B will be 
represented as A &d B {t0, t1} where d>0 and d=t1 - t0; t0 being the time of begin-
ning the duration and t1 the time of end of the interval within which the output 
event becomes true. 
For any two independent events A and B, Fig. 2 represents the timing beha-
viour for A &d B and equations a-e their corresponding mathematical expressions. 
 
Fig. 2 pSAND timing behaviour 
 
{t(A) < t(B)} AND {t(B) – t(A) ≤ d} ⟶ t(A &d B) = t(B)
 (a) 
 
{t(A) < t(B)} AND {t(B) – t(A) > d} ⟶ t(A &d B) = Ø 
 (b) 
 
{t(A) = t(B)} ⟶ t(A &d B) = t(A)
 (c) 
 
{t(A) > t(B)} AND {t(A) – t(B) ≤ d} ⟶ t(A &d B) = t(A)
 (d) 
 
{t(A) > t(B)} AND {t(A) – t(B) > d} ⟶ t(A &d B) = Ø 
 (e) 
In Fig. 2a A occurs before B and the duration of delay between them is less than or 
equal to d but greater than zero: thus A &d B occurs/becomes true. In Fig. 2b A 
occurs before B within the duration which is greater than d and d is greater than 
zero: A &d B does not occur. In Fig. 2c, if A and B occurred at exactly the same 
time then the pSAND would still be true; however, the probability of this occur-
ring with independent events is essentially 0 (though if A and B were not indepen-
dent, the probability could be non-zero). In Fig. 2d B occurs before A within the 
duration which is less or equal to d but greater than zero: A &d B occurs. In Fig. 2e 
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B occurs before A with a duration of delay which is greater than d and greater than 
zero: A &d B does not occur. pSAND occurs when all of its input events occur 
within a specified interval of duration. 
3 Mathematical Model 
It is assumed that all events are non-repairable, exponentially distributed with 
constant failure rates and any system under study is coherent with F(X) being the 
cumulative distributive function of X. Fig. 3 is a graphical representation of a 
pSAND scenario with two input events E1 and E2 having constant failure rates λ1 
and λ2 respectively and a delay ‘d’ between the occurrence of E1 and E2;  E1 occur-
ring at ‘t0’ and E2 occurring anytime between ‘t0’ and ‘t1’. 
 
Fig. 3 pSAND Mathematical graph for two events 
The probability of E1 occurring at t0 and E2 occurring anytime between t0 and t1 
is the pSAND probability of E1 and E2. pSAND is commutative therefore event 
sequence does not matter. Algebraically this can be expressed as: 
 E1 &d E2 {t0,t1 }=E2 &d E1 {t0,t1 }=E1 {0,t0 }*E2 {t0,t1 }+E2 {0,t0 }*E1 {t0,t1 }   (1) 
 Pr(E1 &d E2 ){ t0,t1 }=Pr(E1 {0,t0 }*E2 {t0,t1 }+E2 {0,t0 }*E1 {t0,t1 }) (2) 
=Pr(E1 {0,t0 }*E2 {t0,t1 })+Pr(E2 {0,t0 }*E1 {t0,t1 })-Pr((E1 {0,t0 }*E2 {t0,t1 })*(E2 
{0,t0 }*E1 {t0,t1 }))  (3) 
However, Pr((E1 {0,t0 }*E2 {t0,t1 })*(E2 {0,t0 }*E1 {t0,t1 })) equals 0, assuming E1 
and E2 are independent and a continuous model of time is used, therefore, 
 Pr(E1 &d E2 ){ t0,t1 }=Pr(E1 {0,t0 }*E2 {t0,t1 })+Pr(E2 {0,t0 }*E1 {t0,t1 }) (4) 
 =Pr(E1 {0,t0 })*Pr(E2 {t0,t1 })+Pr(E2 {0,t0 })*Pr(E1 {t0,t1 }) (5) 
 =Pr(E1 {0,t0 })*Pr(E2 {t0,t1 })+Pr(E2 {0,t0 })*Pr(E1 {t0,t1 }) (6) 
Pr(X{a,b})=F(X){a,b}=Exp(-a*x) - Exp(-b*x), F(X) being the Cumulative Distri-
butive Function (CDF) of X. Therefore, 
Pr(E1 &d E2 ){ t0,t1 }=F(E1 ){0,t0 }*(F(E2 ){t0,t1 })+F(E2 ){0,t0 }*(F(E1 ){t0,t1 }) (7) 
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Given that, Pr(X{t0,t1 })=Pr(X{0,t1 })-Pr(X{0,t0 })  
Pr(E1 &d E2 ){ t0,t1 }=F(E1 ){0,t0 }*(F(E2 ){0,t1 }-F(E2 ){0,t0 })+                                
 F(E2 ){0,t0 }*(F(E1){0,t1 }-F(E1 ){0,t0 }) (8) 
It follows that for any n independent events E1, E2, …, En-1 ,En the pSAND  
probability is 
ܲݎሺܧ1&݀ ܧ2&݀ … &݀ ܧ݊−1&݀ ܧ݊ ሻሼ0, ݐ0, ݐ1ሽ = ෍
ۉ
ۈۈ
ۇ
ܨሺܧ݅ሻሼ0, ݐ0ሽ ∗
ۉ
ۈ
ۇෑ ܨሺܧ݅ሻሼݐ0, ݐ1ሽ
݊
݆ =1
݆ ≠݅ ی
ۋ
ۊ
ی
ۋۋ
ۊ݊
݅=1
 
(9)
Monte Carlo (MC) simulation is used to understand and control complex stochas-
tic real world systems. It has been employed in weather forecasting, insurance, 
engineering, financial market, chemical processes, telecommunication networks 
and the like. Its popularity in reliability engineering has increased over the past 
decade. It has been employed in qualitative [22–23] and quantitative [10] analysis.  
A typical MC implementation commences by mathematically modelling known 
and unknown variables of the system under study. This model is run a large num-
ber of times – called trials – based on the outputs expected from the model with 
randomised values of appropriate input variables. This simulated random beha-
viour of the system model allows the estimation of complex real world probabili-
ties provided it has been well modelled and randomised an appreciable number of 
times. 
An algorithm to estimate the pSAND probability for n independent events us-
ing Monte Carlo simulation is: 
1. Generate random numbers for the failure rates of all events. 
2. If, for all events, the first event occurs between {0,t0} while all other events 
occur between {t0,t1} then keep count 
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 for a large number of trials. 
4. Evaluate the pSAND probability by dividing the number of counts by the trials. 
4 Case Study 
The pSAND is useful in differentiating the effects of failures that occur within a 
small interval from effects of more widely spaced failures. To demonstrate the 
relevance of pSAND and prove the proposed techniques, in Fig. 4 we present an 
automotive brake-by-wire (BBW) system, which is adapted from [8]. 
The BBW system contains individual brake actuators with rotation sensors 
connected at each of its four wheels. The central bus serves two major functions: it 
is a medium for controlling the actuators and also carries the signals from the sen-
sors. The signals from the sensors are inputs to a pair of Electronic Control Units 
(ECUs) that control the brakes. To prevent inadvertent braking caused by an  
error in one ECU, the comparator determines the output of both ECUs; if they 
agree, commands are sent to the actuators to activate braking. 'Vehicle dynamics' 
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is a virtual component representing the effect the brakes have on the handling of 
the vehicle and can be thought of as the output of the braking system. It should be 
emphasized that the vehicle dynamics is not a physical component of the system 
but rather a way of representing the success (or failure) of the braking effect on 
the vehicle. For the sake of demonstrating the pSAND concept, the case study 
presented in this work is simplified. The focus is solely on the vehicular dynamics 
based only on the front wheels braking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 An automotive brake-by-wire system 
The failure behaviour of the actuators coupled with its failure data are modelled 
below. ‘IF’ represents the Internal Failure of a component, 'V' represents a value 
deviation (i.e., an error in a signal), and ‘C’ represents inadvertent commission of 
the component. {X} means that a failure can refer to any of FR (front-right), FL 
(front-left), RL (rear-left), or RR (rear-right), e.g. C_ActuatorFL is the front-left 
braking actuator. “+”, “.” and “|” are for logical OR, AND and POR respectively. 
 
C_Actuator{X} = IF_Actuator{X} + C_BusCommand{X} 
C_BusCommand{X}  = C_Comparator{X} + IF_Bus 
C_Comparator{X}  = C_ECU1{X} . C_ECU2{X} + IF_Comparator 
C_ECU{X}   = V_BusSignal{X} + IF_ECU 
V_BusSignal{X} = V_SensorData{X} 
V_SensorData{X}  = IF_Sensor{X} 
  
A thorough qualitative analysis on the entire BBW system produces approximate-
ly 75 MCSQs. A full quantification of the entire MCSQs is outside the scope of 
this paper.  However, to demonstrate the nearly simultaneous scenario explained 
in this work we focus on the effects of inadvertent commission of the front right 
and left actuators.  
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The vehicle dynamics section provides the overall failures of the system. In this 
work, we focus only on the front two wheels, in which case we have three possible 
scenarios: 
• The left wheel brakes either alone or before the right wheel, causing the vehicle 
to veer suddenly to the left. 
• The right wheel brakes either alone or before the left wheel, causing the vehicle 
to veer to the right. 
• Both wheels brake at approximately the same time. 
How critical these failures are depends on whether the vehicle is in a left-hand or 
right-hand drive country, but for the sake of the example let us assume it is left-
hand drive (i.e., vehicles drive on the left). In this case, veering to the right may 
cause the vehicle to veer into oncoming traffic, which is the most severe possible 
failure. Veering to the left may cause the vehicle to go off road, which is still dan-
gerous but less so than a head-on collision with another vehicle. Finally, if both 
wheels brake at the same time, the car is likely to brake in a roughly straight line, 
which is the least severe of the three types of failure. 
These failures can be represented using temporal gates like so: 
 
 VeerIntoOncomingTraffic = C_Actuator_FR | C_Actuator_FL 
 VeerOffRoad = C_Actuator_FL | C_Actuator_FR 
 StraightBraking = C_Actuator_FL &d C_Actuator_FR 
 
Note that here we use the pSAND for the straight-line braking; as long as the 
brakes fail within an interval of about 0.1 seconds, the result will be the less se-
vere straight braking rather than a dangerous veer to the side. The actuators need 
not fail at exactly the same moment. 
Table 1 Failure Probabilities
 
Component Failure rate/hr 
C_Actuator_FL 1E-3 
C_Actuator_FR 1E-3 
Table 2 Results of StraightBraking (C_Actuator_FL &0.1 C_Actuator_FR) 
Time (hrs) Analytical Solution Monte Carlo Solution Percentage Error 
1E1 5.0194E-5 4.9000E-5 2.37 
1E2 4.3873E-4 4.2600E-4 2.90 
1E3 1.1849E-3 1.2110E-3 2.21 
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5 Discussion and Evaluation 
Table 2 contains results of the application of both analytical and Monte Carlo 
solution described in this work on the StraightBraking failure described in the case 
study. Results for both techniques were achieved by modelling them in Mathema-
tica 8; an application for performing many kinds of computations [24]. By using 
small realistic failure data with no dynamic stopping techniques or importance 
measures, we use a large number of trials (10^6) to increase the accuracy of re-
sults. MC simulation is also simplified in this work. It is used just for the purpose 
of demonstration. 
From Table 2, it is clear that both techniques produce results close to each other 
at least to the magnitude. The percentage error is less than 3% which can be con-
sidered to be good considering the fact that we have not used a dynamic stopping 
technique on the Monte Carlo approximation technique.  
In general, the results show that the probability of both C_Actuator_FR and 
C_Actuator_FL increases with time. Meaning the more time given, the more like-
ly it is for the two events to occur within d. 
From equation (9), it can be seen that if d (which is equal to t1 – t0) is zero, the 
pSAND probability is also zero which means it technically becomes a SAND. 
Although we have provided an analytical solution in this work, we have also 
provided a simulative alternative. This is not to necessarily evaluate the analytical 
solution but to provide a framework for estimating the pSAND probability of 
events with distributions other than an exponential distribution. 
For future work, one may consider the possibility of parameterising the PAND 
and POR gates to achieve some form of completion [5] [9]. 
6 Conclusion 
In modern dynamic systems, it is often necessary to be able to represent scenarios 
involving events which are "nearly simultaneous", i.e., they occur together within 
a short period of time. It is common for the effects of such failures to be different 
if they occur nearly simultaneously compared to occurring further apart, as in the 
braking system presented earlier. However, it is difficult to model this situation in 
current FTA approaches. Pandora, a modification to FTA, provides the SAND 
gate to represent simultaneous occurrence of events, but does not cater for any 
delay between occurrences. This paper extends Pandora’s definition of SAND 
gates to provide "parameterised SAND" gates or pSANDs, which can be used in 
modelling and evaluating nearly simultaneous scenarios. We have proposed new 
logical representations for pSAND and provided its exact and approximated calcu-
lations using analytical and Monte Carlo solutions respectively. The result is a 
more flexible analytical approach that enables Pandora-based FTA to be applied to 
a greater variety of situations in modern safety critical systems.  
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